

# How to measure KINDNS?

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# Introduction

- Several best practices to improve DNS resilience have appeared in RFCs, but operators must make their own decisions that tradeoff security, cost, and complexity.
- These decisions impact the security of billions of Internet users.
- ICANN has proposed an initiative to codify best practices into a set of global norms to improve security: the ***Knowledge-Sharing and Instantiating Norms for DNS and Naming Security (KINDNS)***.

# KINDNS: a MANRS for DNS

- Inspired by similar effort for improving routing security: **Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)**.
  - The MANRS program encourages operators to voluntarily commit to a set of practices that will improve collective routing security.
  - Many operators have joined the MANRS community.
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# Our Contribution

- One challenge for both initiatives:  
*independent verification of conformance with the practices*
  - To address this challenge for KINDNS, we analyzed possible best practices in terms of **measurability** by third party.
  - We leveraged previous academic research and currently publicly available datasets.
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## What's measurable (and already measured)?

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- DNSSEC Adoption (Active Scans, e.g., OpenINTEL, Rapid7)
- Geographically, Topologically, NS Diversity (Active Scans)
- QNAME minimization (Passive and Active Scans)
- MANRS/BCP38 compliancy (Spoofer)

# What's still to measure?

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- Authoritative and Recursive DNS software not on the same server
  - Focus on Open Resolvers
- ACLs and non-DNS service exposure (Port Scans)
  - Focus on well-known ports
- DoH/DoT adoption in the wild
- Software Diversity (Fingerprinting)
  - Challenging

## Some (very) initial results

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- Over 638K authoritative nameservers IPs :
  - 52% have web port (80) open
  - ~40% have mail ports open (25, 995, etc.).
  - 31% have SSH port open
  - Other popular ports open are: (s)FTP, Windows Share, SUN RPC
  - 1.5% of authoritative are recursion enabled!

## Some (very) initial results

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- Over 1613K recursive resolvers IPs:
  - 8% have web port (80) open
  - 6% have SSH port open
  - 5% have Telnet port open!!
  - We also see mail and other services
  - Only 85 DoH properly configured recursive resolvers and 78 DoT (currently investigating)



# Non- Measurable Practices

Some proposed practices are not measurable without an internal vantage point:

- Monitoring
- Internal ACL
- SSH Authentication requirements
- Server hardening, integrity and versioning

AXFR scan (ethics?)

Others, like Zone Integrity (Authoritative, require sharing of **rapid zone updates**.



# Discussion Questions

- How can researchers help to assess conformance with DNS best practices?
- What do you think is missing?
- Are there ways to overcome concerns with data sharing?



# Thanks for the attention

If you want to help reach me:

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